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I INTRODUCTION 
There is a familiar story told about section 75(v) of the Constitution. The 
story starts with the famous United States case of Marbury v Madison,1 where the 
Supreme Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to grant an order of 
mandamus directed to the Secretary of State, James Madison, to enforce the 
delivery of a judicial commission to William Marbury. 
The story continues that when Andrew Inglis Clark, who was a delegate to 
the 1891 Constitutional Convention, sat down to draft a constitution to be 
distributed to the other delegates before the Convention started, he included a 
provision that was to be the forerunner of section 75(v). The insertion of that 
provision, it is said, was intended to rectify what he saw to be a flaw in the 
United States Constitution exposed by the decision in Marbury v Madison. There 
was little discussion about the clause during the 1891 Convention, and it formed 
part of the 1891 draft constitution. 
The provision also found a place in the drafts adopted during the Adelaide 
and Sydney sessions of the 1897-8 Convention. However, by the time of the 
Melbourne session of that Convention in 1898, with Inglis Clark not a delegate, 
no one could remember what the provision was there for and it was struck out. 
Following developments from Tasmania, Inglis Clark sent a telegram to 
Edmund Barton, the leader of the Convention, presumably requesting the 
reinstatement of the provision. As is now well known, in his reply, Barton said: 
  
                                                 
*  Associate Professor, ANU College of Law; Consultant, Sparke Helmore. An earlier version of this article 
was presented at a seminar organised by the Centre for International and Public Law, ANU College of 
Law. Many thanks to Professor Kim Rubenstein for the invitation to speak at the seminar, and to seminar 
participants for their comments. My thanks also to the anonymous referees for their very helpful 
suggestions. 
1  5 US 137 (1803). 
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I have to thank you further for your telegram as to the striking out of the power 
given to the High Court to deal with cases of mandamus and prohibition against 
officers of the Commonwealth. None of us here had read the case mentioned by 
you of Marbury v Madison or if seen it has been forgotten. It seems however to be 
a leading case. I have given notice to restore the words on the reconsideration of 
the clause.2 
The provision was then reinserted, and what were to be the final words on the 
provision before the debate ended, Barton said: 
This provision is applicable to those three special classes of cases in which public 
officers can be dealt with, and in which it is necessary that they should be dealt 
with, so that the High Court may exercise its function of protecting the subject 
against any violation of the Constitution, or of any law made under the 
Constitution.3 
This purpose, which will be referred to later in this article as an 
accountability purpose, has been taken on by the High Court. In Bank of New 
South Wales v Commonwealth (‘Bank Nationalisation Case’) Dixon J said that 
the inclusion of section 75(v) was ‘to make it constitutionally certain that there 
would be a jurisdiction capable of restraining officers of the Commonwealth 
from exceeding Federal power.’4 More recently, in Plaintiff S157/2002 v 
Commonwealth, having referred to Justice Dixon’s statement, five members of 
the Court said: 
The reservation to this Court by the Constitution of the jurisdiction in all matters 
in which the named constitutional writs or an injunction are sought against an 
officer of the Commonwealth is a means of assuring to all people affected that 
officers of the Commonwealth obey the law and neither exceed nor neglect any 
jurisdiction which the law confers on them. The centrality, and protective purpose, 
of the jurisdiction of this Court in that regard places significant barriers in the way 
of legislative attempts (by privative clauses or otherwise) to impair judicial review 
of administrative action. Such jurisdiction exists to maintain the federal compact 
by ensuring that propounded laws are constitutionally valid and ministerial or 
other official action lawful and within jurisdiction.5 
In this way, the Court said, section 75(v) introduced ‘into the Constitution of 
the Commonwealth an entrenched minimum provision of judicial review’.6 Six 
members of the Court then adopted these passages in Bodruddaza v Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.7 
That, then, is the usual story. Section 75(v) is a provision that serves an 
accountability function. It was included in Chapter III of the Constitution to 
ensure that the High Court has jurisdiction to hold Commonwealth officers to 
account. 
                                                 
2  John M Williams, The Australian Constitution: A Documentary History (Melbourne University Press, 
2005) 846. 
3  Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 4 March 1898, 1885. 
4  (1948) 76 CLR 1, 363. 
5  (2003) 211 CLR 467, 513–14 (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). 
6  Ibid 513. 
7  (2007) 228 CLR 651, 668–9 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). See also 
Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth (2010) 272 ALR 14, 27 (‘Plaintiff M61’); MZXOT v Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 233 CLR 601, 614 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ) 
(‘MZXOT’). 
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The primary aim of this article is to explain that this usual story of section 
75(v) is only part of the story, and that to focus exclusively on the accountability 
function may, on occasion, lead us astray. The drafting history of section 75(v) 
reveals a much more complicated picture of the reasons for its inclusion. The 
article will then consider how this more complicated understanding of the 
drafting history impacts on four issues arising from the operation of section 
75(v):  
(i) the relationship between section 75(iii) and (v);  
(ii) the meaning of the expression ‘officer of the Commonwealth’ in 
section 75(v);  
(iii) the existence of state jurisdiction to order writs against federal officers; 
and  
(iv) the minimum provision of judicial review entrenched by section 75(v). 
 
II THE MULTIPLE PURPOSES OF SECTION 75(V) 
As indicated, the usual story set out above as to the purpose of section 75(v) 
is only part of the story. There were four main contributors to the historical 
development of the forerunners to section 75(v): Inglis Clark, Barton, Isaac 
Isaacs and Josiah Symon. As will be seen, each delegate made an important and 
distinct contribution to the development of what is now section 75(v). 
In reassessing the drafting history of section 75(v), three main points will be 
emphasised. The first is that Inglis Clark did not have an accountability purpose 
in mind when he introduced the provision into the Constitution. No doubt he 
thought the Court would have the function of judicial review, but his forerunner 
to section 75(v) was not designed to give effect to that accountability purpose. 
Instead, Inglis Clark’s motivating concern was one of distribution or allocation 
of jurisdiction between original and appellate jurisdiction, a design that was only 
fully appreciated by Isaacs. The second point is that Barton, who advanced the 
accountability purpose of section 75(v), did so very late in the debate, having 
reintroduced the relevant clauses in response to Inglis Clark’s concerns about 
jurisdictional allocation. The third point that will be emphasised is that the 
Convention Debates reveal another purpose for section 75(v) that sees it 
operating to protect the Commonwealth government and its officers from state 
judicial power. This federalist understanding of section 75(v) was as equally 
prevalent during the Convention Debates as the now popular accountability 
purpose that protects the individual from an exercise of Commonwealth 
executive power. 
As will be explained, these three distinct understandings of section 75(v) – 
jurisdiction allocation, accountability and federalist – were disguised by the 
drafting history of the relevant Chapter III clauses, but are revealed by a close 
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consideration of the Convention Debates alongside the successive drafts of the 
Constitution.8 
 
A Allocation/Distribution of Jurisdiction 
To understand what Inglis Clark was trying to achieve, it is necessary to look 
more closely at what Marbury v Madison actually decided. It is important to start 
with the judicial provisions in the United States Constitution. Article III, section 
2, paragraph 1 provides that ‘the judicial Power [of the United States] shall 
extend to’ an enumerated list of cases and controversies including: ‘all Cases, in 
Law and Equity, arising under … the Laws of the United States’; ‘all Cases 
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls’; ‘Controversies to 
which the United States shall be a party’; and ‘Controversies between two or 
more States; [and] between a State and Citizens of another State’. 
Paragraph 2 of Article III, section 2 then continues:  
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those 
in which a State shall be Party, the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. 
In all the other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate 
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such 
Regulations as the Congress shall make.  
As can be seen, the two items identified in the second paragraph are 
categories of cases or controversies covered in the first paragraph. 
When Marbury sought relief by way of mandamus against Madison in the 
United States Supreme Court, the Court had to consider whether it had 
jurisdiction to hear the claim. Since the right claimed was given by a law of the 
United States, the Court considered it to be a case of federal judicial power 
within the categories of cases enumerated in section 2 (that is, a case ‘arising 
under … the Laws of the United States’).9 However, whether the Court had 
jurisdiction to issue the claimed relief depended on two things: first, whether this 
claim was instituted in the Court’s original or appellate jurisdiction; and second, 
whether the type of case in question (that is, a case ‘arising under the laws of the 
United States’) was to be heard in the Court’s original or appellate jurisdiction. 
As for the first issue, the Court considered that Marbury’s claim was one that 
fell within original jurisdiction.10 For the Court, it was ‘the essential criterion of 
appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause 
already instituted, and does not create that cause’. To order mandamus against a 
federal government officer for the delivery of a commission was ‘in effect the 
same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and therefore seems not to 
belong to appellate, but to original jurisdiction’.11 Thus, Marbury was seeking 
relief in the Court’s original jurisdiction. 
                                                 
8  This article has benefited considerably from the publication of the successive drafts of the Constitution by 
John Williams, above n 2. 
9  Marbury v Madison, 5 US 137, 173 (1803). 
10  Ibid 175–6. 
11  Ibid.  
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However, had the Court been given original jurisdiction to hear such a claim 
for relief? In this regard the Court considered that the relevant provisions of 
Article III are structured in a way that sets out a list of cases of federal judicial 
power, and then goes on to distribute them between original and appellate 
jurisdiction. Cases ‘arising under … the Laws of the United States’ had not been 
allocated to the original jurisdiction of the Court; only the two matters mentioned 
in paragraph 2 were allocated to original jurisdiction. In response to the 
suggestion that Congress could assign original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court 
in cases other than the two mentioned in paragraph 2, the Court replied: 
If it had been intended to leave it to the discretion of the legislature to apportion 
the judicial power between the supreme and inferior courts according to the will of 
that body, it would certainly have been useless to have proceeded further than to 
have defined the judicial powers, and the tribunals in which it should be vested. 
The subsequent part of the section is mere surplusage, is entirely without meaning, 
if such is to be the construction. If congress remains at liberty to give this court 
appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall 
be original; and original jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be 
appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction made in the constitution, is form without 
substance. … 
When an instrument organizing fundamentally a judicial system, divides it into 
one supreme, and so many inferior courts as the legislature may ordain and 
establish; then enumerates its powers, and proceeds so far to distribute them, as to 
define the jurisdiction of the supreme court by declaring the cases in which it shall 
take original jurisdiction, and that in others it shall take appellate jurisdiction; the 
plain import of the words seems to be, that in one class of cases its jurisdiction is 
original, and not appellate; in the other it is appellate, and not original. If any other 
construction would render the clause inoperative, that is an additional reason for 
rejecting such other construction, and for adhering to their obvious meaning.12 
Thus, the Court could not issue the relief because it did not have original 
jurisdiction in relation to the case. 
When Inglis Clark sat down to draft the judicial provisions of his 
constitution, he adopted the structure and much of the content of Article III. In 
his clause 62, the judicial power of the Federal Dominion of Australasia was to 
extend to a list of cases or controversies, including: ‘cases arising under any 
Laws made by the Federal Parliament’; ‘all cases affecting the Public Ministers, 
or other accredited representatives of other Countries, and Consuls’; ‘all cases in 
which the Federal Dominion of Australasia shall be a party’; and ‘disputes or 
controversies between two or more Provinces’.13 The cases and controversies set 
out in clause 62 closely reflected those included in Article III, section 2, 
paragraph 1 of the United States Constitution. 
In clauses 63 and 64, Inglis Clark proceeded to divide the cases and 
controversies between original and appellate jurisdiction, in the same terms as 
Article III, section 2, paragraph 2 of the United States Constitution. Those 
clauses read:  
  
                                                 
12  Ibid 174–5. 
13  See Williams, above n 2, 88. 
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Clause 63: In all cases affecting Public Ministers, or other accredited 
Representatives of other Countries, and Consuls, and in all cases in which a 
Province shall be a party, or in which a Writ of Mandamus or Prohibition shall be 
sought against a Minister of the Crown for the Federal Dominion of Australasia, 
the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. 
Clause 64: In all cases other than those mentioned in the immediately preceding 
section the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, 
with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Federal Parliament shall 
authorise.14 
The resemblance to the United States Constitution in both structure and 
content is clear.15 The only relevant difference is the inclusion in clause 63, 
within original jurisdiction, of cases ‘in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition 
shall be sought against a Minister of the Crown for the Federal Dominion of 
Australasia’.  
Given his understanding of the constitutional law of the United States, 
including the decision in Marbury v Madison, it is reasonable to infer that Inglis 
Clark intended that his clauses 62–4 would operate in the same way as Article 
III, Section 2, paragraphs 1 and 2 were said to operate by the Supreme Court in 
Marbury v Madison. That is, clause 62 operated to identify categories of cases 
and controversies to which federal judicial power would extend, and clauses 63 
and 64 operated to allocate those cases or controversies either to original or 
appellate jurisdiction. 
Because the reference to writs of mandamus and prohibition was only 
included in clause 63 and not clause 62 of Inglis Clark’s draft, his assumption 
must have been that claims for such writs against Commonwealth officers would 
otherwise fall within one of the categories of cases or controversies in his clause 
62. Such categories of cases may have included ‘cases arising under any law 
made by the Federal Parliament’;16 ‘cases in which the Federal Dominion of 
Australasia shall be a party’;17 or ‘cases in Law and Equity arising under this Act 
[the Constitution]’.18 Under Inglis Clark’s design, those cases would fall within 
the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court, except to the extent that there was a 
claim for mandamus or prohibition against an officer of the Commonwealth. This 
was a direct and narrowly targeted response to Marbury v Madison. 
The first official draft of the Constitution contained this basic structure and 
breakdown of content, as did the draft provisions prepared by the Judiciary 
Committee chaired by Inglis Clark.19 However, there must have been early 
                                                 
14  Clause 64 went on to give the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction from the courts of the Colonies. The 
draft prepared by Charles Kingston had similar content and structure, but no reference to writs of 
mandamus and prohibition: Ibid, 89, 127–8. 
15  In a memorandum to the delegates before the 1891 Convention started, Inglis Clark explained that he had 
largely ‘followed the American model’: see Williams, above n 2, 69. 
16  The forerunner of s 76(ii) of the Constitution. This was the case in Marbury v Madison where a statute 
had created the right claimed: 5 US 137, 174–5 (1803)). Equally it would be available where the statute 
imposed a duty on an executive officer that is sought to be enforced. 
17  The forerunner of s 75(iii) of the Constitution. 
18  The forerunner of s 76(i) of the Constitution. 
19  Both of which were dated 24 March 1891: see Williams, above n 2, 151, 359–61. 
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doubts (at least from Sir Samuel Griffith, the chair of the 1891 Constitutional 
Committee and member of its Drafting Committee) as to whether writs of 
mandamus and prohibition would otherwise fall into the list of categories of 
cases and controversies (or perhaps some confusion as to what Inglis Clark was 
trying to do), because the list of cases defining the extent of federal judicial 
power was then changed to include an express reference to mandamus and 
prohibition.20 Except for one period of time, from that point on until the draft 
constitution went to the Drafting Committee in Melbourne in 1898 for its final 
drafting changes, the same basic structure was adopted. The list of categories of 
cases that triggered federal judicial power included a reference to mandamus and 
prohibition, and then a subsequent clause allocated the jurisdiction in such a way 
that the High Court would have original jurisdiction (and later both original and 
appellate jurisdiction)21 to hear such claims. The exception was the brief period 
when the reference to writs of mandamus and prohibition was, during the 
Melbourne session of the Convention, struck out of both the list of heads of 
matters defining the extent of federal judicial power and the subsequent clause 
allocating jurisdiction between original and appellate jurisdiction.22 The clauses 
were stuck out on the 31 January 1898,23 and reinserted on 4 March 1898 upon 
further consideration.24 
The striking out was largely driven by Isaac Isaacs, who considered that the 
express mention of mandamus and prohibition achieved nothing, introduced a 
conflation of power and remedy and might cause interpretive difficulties.25 
Barton had proposed the striking out, but on the basis of what Isaacs had said to 
him.26 
It is important to explore Isaacs’ position further. From his contributions to 
the striking out debate and then in opposition to the reinsertion of the clauses, it 
                                                 
20  A handwritten notation by Griffith inserting writs of mandamus and prohibition against officers of the 
Commonwealth into the list of cases and controversies appears on a First Proof Submitted to the 
Constitutional Committee, dated 26 March 1891: Williams, above n 2, 178. John Williams has observed 
that ‘It cannot be determined whether Griffith’s annotations … were made during or after the discussions 
of the Constitutional Committee on 26 March’: at 162. The handwritten notation was again made on the 
draft dated 28 March 1891 containing the changes agreed to by the Drafting Committee (comprising 
Griffith, Kingston and Barton – in Inglis Clark’s absence) during the Lucinda voyage: at 199. The revised 
drafts following the Lucinda draft, and the successive drafts thereafter, included writs of mandamus and 
prohibition amongst the list of categories of cases defining the extent of federal judicial power as well as 
in the subsequent clause allocating jurisdiction between original and appellate jurisdiction: at 212, 228. 
21  In an early draft dated 28 March 1891, there was a handwritten notation by Griffith changing the 
allocation of these items from original jurisdiction (as envisaged by Inglis Clark) to original and 
appellate jurisdiction: Williams, above n 2, 179. The changes were then made to the typed text in the 
revised draft dated 28 March 1891: at 228. 
22  By then the American words ‘cases’ and ‘controversies’ had been replaced by the word ‘matters’. 
23  Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 31 January 1898, 321 
(the list of matters of judicial power), 349 (the allocating provision). 
24  Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 4 March 1898, 1885 
(the list of matters of judicial power), 1894 (the allocating provision). 
25  Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 31 January 1898, 
321. 
26  Ibid 320. 
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is clear that Isaacs was of the view that claims for mandamus and prohibition 
would otherwise be made in matters falling within the category later described as 
‘matters … [i]n which the Commonwealth, or a person suing or being sued on 
behalf of the Commonwealth, is a party’ – the section 75(iii) forerunner.27 And, 
from the first official draft of the Constitution, that category of matters had been 
included in both the list of matters to which Commonwealth judicial power 
extended and the subsequent clause allocating original jurisdiction to the Court.28 
Thus, the inclusion of references to mandamus and prohibition was unnecessary 
as the Court would have the power to enforce its decrees when exercising its 
jurisdiction by whatever remedy was appropriate.29 
Furthermore, Isaacs was concerned that judicial power was being defined by 
reference to a set of remedies. In an exchange with Barton about the need for the 
provision’s reinsertion, Isaacs said: 
This [mandamus] is, only a remedy for carrying out powers of the court, and you 
cannot put within the judicial power a mere remedy where there is no right. The 
great distinction between the Constitution as we frame it and the Constitution of 
the United States is that in the United States there is no original jurisdiction at all, 
in a case where the Commonwealth or a person suing or being sued on behalf of 
the Commonwealth is a party, and therefore you can understand how a mandamus 
being a remedy in such a case is not within its original jurisdiction. But we put it 
within the original jurisdiction here, and it seems to me that a mandamus follows 
with it.30 
Thus, Isaacs understood Inglis Clark’s structural plan,31 but recognised the 
conceptual difficulties of mixing remedies with power.32 
                                                 
27  Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 4 March 1898, 1882–
3. 
28  Williams, above n 2, 151. Closely following the US model in this respect, Inglis Clark had not allocated 
this category of case to original jurisdiction: Williams, above n 2, 89. It is possible that Griffith’s first 
official draft was influenced by Kingston’s draft which did allocate to original jurisdiction ‘all 
controversies to which the Union shall be a party’: at 127. 
29  In response to a question by Bernhard Wise, Isaacs said that mandamus would be ‘ancillary to every case 
where the Court has jurisdiction’: Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, 
Melbourne, 4 March 1898, 1883. He also made the point that if the Court was considering a case arising 
under the Constitution, it would have the power ‘to exercise its jurisdiction by way of mandamus, or 
injunction, or prohibition’: at 1881. Indeed, it would appear that Isaacs’ position on the provision was 
initially accepted by the delegates. By deleting the reference to mandamus and prohibition in both the list 
of cases of judicial power and the subsequent allocating provision, the drafters must have assumed that 
claims for mandamus and prohibition against Commonwealth officers would otherwise fall within a 
category of judicial power. See, eg, Barton’s statement on the reintroduction of the provisions: ‘but 
ultimately the sub-section was left out, on the ground that the proceeding could probably be taken without 
any express power being given for them’: at 1875. 
30  Ibid 1882–3. 
31  The only relevant difference between Inglis Clark’s intended design and that of Isaacs was that the 
forerunner to s 75(iii) had not been allocated to the High Court’s original jurisdiction in Inglis Clark’s 
draft. Whereas, it had by the time Isaacs put forward his views. 
32  At this point the heads of federal jurisdiction were still described as matters to which the federal judicial 
power extended. It was not until the Drafting Committee redrafted the provisions at the end of the 
Melbourne session of the 1897–8 Constitutional Convention that the language of jurisdiction was used. 
This initial use of the expression of judicial power may have accounted for Isaacs’ concerns in this 
regard. 
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Finally, for Isaacs the insertion of mandamus and prohibition might in fact 
operate as words of limitation. In supporting the striking out of the clauses, he 
said: ‘if we put in these words the inference will be irresistible that if they had 
not been put in the court would not have had this power’. 33 In opposition to their 
reinsertion, he continued: ‘My great objection to the proposal is that it will 
operate as a limitation upon other provisions for judicial power. It assumes there 
is no power to grant a mandamus.’34 
Thus, given that actions against officers of the Commonwealth would 
otherwise come within the Court’s original jurisdiction, Isaacs considered that 
the exclusion of the clauses on mandamus and prohibition would still achieve 
Inglis Clark’s intention, but without the complications and possible dangers of 
their express inclusion. 
To summarise so far, it would appear that Inglis Clark’s original intention was to 
ensure that the High Court had original – as opposed to appellate – jurisdiction to 
hear claims for mandamus and prohibition. This purpose related to the allocation or 
distribution of federal jurisdiction between original and appellate jurisdiction, and 
was a direct response to the actual problem in Marbury v Madison. Isaacs understood 
that intended design, but thought it was achieved by the forerunner to section 75(iii) 
having been allocated to the Court’s original jurisdiction. 
Unfortunately, it is unclear what Inglis Clark said to Barton in his telegram 
urging the reinsertion of the clauses. However, it must have been, at least in part, 
to emphasise this intention for the provision,35 as Barton seemed to make the 
same point when he sought to reintroduce the clause at the end of the Melbourne 
session. He said:36 
The object of this clause is a very clear one … In certain cases the Supreme Court 
would have original jurisdiction, in others appellate. If you do not specially 
mention this, then in cases of mandamus, prohibition and injunction, it can only 
have the ordinary appellate jurisdiction, but if you mention it specially as within 
the judicial power, and provide for it as an original jurisdiction, then a case may 
be taken straight to the court instead of having to filter through another court.37 
                                                 
33  Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 31 January 1898, 
321. 
34  Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 4 March 1898, 1879. 
35  This conclusion is also supported by a letter sent by Inglis Clark to one of the delegates to the Melbourne 
session of the 1897–8 Convention, Bernhard Wise, in which Inglis Clark urged ‘the restoration of the 
clause giving the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in cases of Mandamus and Prohibition against 
officers of the Commonwealth’: Williams, above n 2, 848 (emphasis added). The emphasised words 
appear to have been deliberately chosen in contrast to the tail end of the same sentence where Inglis Clark 
urged Wise to support ‘the insertion of a clause extending the judicial power of the Commonwealth to 
suits between citizens of different States’: at 848 (emphasis added). Thus, it was not just a matter of 
extending judicial power to writs of mandamus or prohibition; it was a question of giving the Supreme 
Court original jurisdiction to hear them. Consistently with the view that he must have held when drafting 
his original clauses, Inglis Clark seems to have assumed that writs of mandamus and prohibition would 
have otherwise fallen into the list of categories of cases triggering federal jurisdiction. 
36  Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 4 March 1898, 1881. 
37  As explained below, Barton had doubts as to whether writs of mandamus and prohibition would 
otherwise fall within the categories of cases of federal jurisdiction. That explains his emphasis on the 
need to ‘mention it specially as within the judicial power, and provide for it as an original jurisdiction’. 
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The same point was emphasised again by Barton in other contributions.38 
Inglis Clark’s design was, however, by the end entirely lost from view. 
Unlike Isaacs (and perhaps Josiah Symon),39 Barton considered that the claims 
for mandamus and prohibition against Commonwealth officers would not come 
within what is now section 75(iii) or any other federal matter either because ‘a 
proceeding against the Crown cannot be taken without an express Act to 
authorize it’40 or because the words did not cover ‘a person who is being simply 
impleaded in an action of law’.41 Consequently, for Barton, the inclusion of writs 
in the list of cases of judicial power operated to create federal jurisdiction. Thus, 
by the end of the delegates’ contributions, Inglis Clark’s original design had been 
fundamentally altered. Mandamus and prohibition were included in the clause 
defining the extent of federal judicial power and in the subsequent provision 
allocating original jurisdiction to the High Court. The former clause operated to 
create jurisdiction, the latter to identify it as original jurisdiction (as well as 
appellate jurisdiction). 
Furthermore, the final stages of the drafting process were to substantially 
alter the structure of these judicial provisions. Whereas the model in the United 
States, as adopted by Inglis Clark and the Convention until that time, was to set 
out a list of cases of federal jurisdiction and then, subsequently, to allocate them 
between the High Court’s original and appellate jurisdiction, that structure 
resulted in some inelegant drafting in light of the fact that the High Court was 
also to be given appellate jurisdiction in a separate clause.42 
There was no equivalent appellate jurisdiction clause in Article III of the 
United States Constitution, as the Supreme Court was not to be a court of general 
appeal from state courts. But, in Australia, it was always intended that the High 
Court would perform that general appellate function.43 On that basis, it was no 
doubt easier to deal with the High Court’s original jurisdiction in one set of 
clauses and its appellate jurisdiction from all courts – federal and state – in 
                                                 
38  Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 4 March 1898, 1883–
4, 1885. 
39  Symon agreed with Isaacs that the Court ‘would have the jurisdiction’: ibid 1882. However, as will be 
explored further below, he had a very different reason for making claims for mandamus and prohibition a 
matter of original federal jurisdiction – a federalist reason that protected Commonwealth officers from 
State judicial power. 
40  Ibid 1875. 
41  Ibid 1884. It is possible that Barton recalled an explanation given to him by Griffith on the Lucinda as to 
why it was necessary to include mandamus and prohibition in both the list of matters to which federal 
judicial power extended and the subsequent clause allocating it as original jurisdiction: see above n 21. 
42  This separate clause as proposed by Inglis Clark, and as initially adopted in early drafts of the 
Constitution, dealt only with appeals from State courts. By the time the clause went to the Drafting 
Committee for its final drafting changes at the end of the Melbourne session of the 1897–8 Convention 
the separate appeal clause provided for appeals from both State and federal courts. 
43  For discussion of earlier attempts to create an Australasian Court of Appeal, see J M Bennett, Keystone of 
the Federal Arch: A Historical Memoir of the High Court of Australia to 1980 (Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1980) 3–5. The establishment of a general court of appeal was contemplated in the 
resolutions for the Sydney Convention in 1891 (see Williams, above n 2, 47), and was a central pillar of 
the judiciary provisions throughout the debates. 
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another clause. Thus, we see the Drafting Committee44 moving away from the 
structure in the United States to a different one that we now have: sections 75 and 
76 deal with original jurisdiction and section 73 deals with appellate 
jurisdiction.45 
The end result is that we have one reference in section 75(v) to writs of 
mandamus and prohibition (with the addition of injunctions46). While this 
achieved Inglis Clark’s intention of ensuring that the Court was to have original 
jurisdiction, the final structure adopted disguises the fact that Inglis Clark’s 
intention (along with one of Barton’s expressed intentions during the debates) 
was to respond to Marbury v Madison, a problem about allocating or dividing 
federal jurisdiction. For Inglis Clark, his clause 63 allocated writs of mandamus 
and prohibition to the Court’s original jurisdiction: it did not operate to create 
jurisdiction. 
 
B Barton’s Accountability Purpose 
Although Barton was initially persuaded by Isaacs to urge the Convention to 
strike out the mandamus and prohibition clauses, he changed his mind following 
the telegram from Inglis Clark. Marbury v Madison seemed ‘to be a leading case’ 
and so he gave notice ‘to restore the words on the reconsideration of the 
clause’.47  
When initially explaining why the category of mandamus, prohibition and 
injunctions should be reintroduced into the list of cases of judicial power, Barton 
did not accurately capture the Marbury v Madison problem. He presented the 
argument on the basis that the Supreme Court did not have the ‘right of 
entertaining cases of mandamus or prohibition against an officer of the United 
States … the Constitution did not place in the hands of the High Court the power 
to entertain these questions’.48 He explained his concern that it might be held by 
the High Court that it did not have the power, and that a statute conferring such a 
power would be invalid.49 This was a misunderstanding of the case. The Court 
had no original jurisdiction, but it had appellate jurisdiction.50 
This imprecision, however, seemed to be rectified by Barton later in the 
debates when he returned to explain the finding in Marbury v Madison and the 
problem that was sought to be overcome.51 As mentioned earlier, it was to  
                                                 
44  Consisting of Barton, Richard O’Connor and Sir John Downer, with the assistance of Robert Garran. 
45  These changes were adopted without further debate: Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian 
Federal Convention, Melbourne, 16 March 1898, 2453, 2456. 
46  A reference to injunction was included in the clauses as reintroduced by Barton. Until that time, the 
relevant clauses only referred to mandamus and prohibition. 
47  Williams, above n 2, 846. 
48  Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 4 March 1898, 1875. 
49  Ibid 1876. 
50  That misunderstanding may partly explain why Barton formed the view that claims for mandamus and 
prohibition needed to be included in the list of cases of judicial power as well as in the provision dividing 
jurisdiction between original and appellate jurisdiction. 
51  Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 4 March 1898, 1881, 
1883, 1884. 
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give the High Court original jurisdiction, as well as appellate jurisdiction, in these 
cases, so that when a person wishes to obtain the performance of a clear statutory 
duty, or to restrain an officer of the Commonwealth from going beyond his duty, 
or to restrain him in the performance of some statutory duty from doing some 
wrong, he can obtain a writ of mandamus, a writ of prohibition, or a writ of 
injunction.52 
For Barton, this would be achieved by the inclusion of mandamus, 
prohibition and injunction in the clause defining the extent to which the judicial 
power extended (as he did not consider those matters to otherwise fall within the 
various enumerated matters), and to the subsequent clause allocating the High 
Court original and appellate jurisdiction in that matter. 
Ostensibly, Barton was supporting the reintroduction of the clauses for Inglis 
Clark’s jurisdiction allocation purpose. However, he also considered that 
jurisdiction had to be created, and, importantly, his inclusion of mandamus, 
prohibition and injunction in the clause defining the extent of federal judicial 
power was for the purposes of creating an accountability mechanism. Thus, 
without further contribution by the delegates, Barton ended the debates by saying 
that the clause was designed to allow the High Court to ‘exercise its function of 
protecting the subject against any violation of the Constitution, or of any law 
made under the Constitution’.53 
 
C Alternate Federalist Vision of Section 75(v) 
The fourth main contributor to the debate, Symon, painted a very different 
picture of the section 75(v) forerunners. In support of reinserting the clause that 
would define judicial power to extend to mandamus, prohibition and injunction 
against an officer of the Commonwealth, and in the course of dismissing 
concerns that section 75(v) would unsettle the relationship between the executive 
and the judiciary, Symon – who had been chairman of the Judiciary Committee – 
insisted that ‘the sole object that the Judicial Committee had in view in inserting 
it in the first instance’54 was to protect federal officers from state jurisdiction:55 
All it says is that an application for mandamus or prohibition against an officer of 
the Commonwealth must be taken to the High Court or other of the Federal 
Courts. An application cannot be made to a state court, although the incident 
which brings the application about may happen in a particular state. … It is a 
safeguard and a limitation. It prevents an officer of the Commonwealth, whether 
Minister or anybody else, from being proceeded against in any state, in regard to 
the Commonwealth.56  
The necessity [of its reinsertion] is to bring all those applications for writs of 
mandamus, prohibition, and injunctions as against officers of the Commonwealth 
in the Commonwealth courts, and not to have them brought in the state courts, in 
which they undoubtedly ought not to be brought.57  
                                                 
52  Ibid 1884. 
53  Ibid 1885. 
54  Ibid 1879. 
55  Ibid 1882. 
56  Ibid 1878. 
57  Ibid 1879. 
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What we want to prevent is that state courts shall have the jurisdiction over 
Commonwealth officers.58 
Although Symon spoke in terms of protecting federal officers from state 
courts, it is clear that he appreciated the Chapter III scheme that state courts 
would exercise federal jurisdiction, and that such applications might proceed in 
state courts if invested with federal jurisdiction.59 Thus, it was an exercise of state 
judicial power that Symon sought to protect federal officers from. 
For Symon, then, the inclusion of mandamus, prohibition and injunction in 
the clause defining the extent of judicial power was designed to create federal 
jurisdiction. And, importantly, Symon was of the view that it would create 
exclusive federal jurisdiction displacing the possibility of state jurisdiction over 
federal officers.60 In this respect, Isaacs took issue. Isaacs responded to Symon 
that the clause did not make the jurisdiction exclusive, and ‘if the power to make 
such an application in the state court exists the insertion of these words cannot 
take that power away.’61 It is not clear what impact this exchange had on the 
other delegates, although at least Sir Edward Braddon was left with the 
impression that the jurisdiction would be exclusive.62 
Regardless, it would appear that Isaacs had a point. At that stage of the 
debates, the draft constitution contained the forerunner of the current sections 
77(ii) and 77(iii) which allow Parliament to invest federal jurisdiction in state 
courts, but to make certain matters of federal jurisdiction exclusive to federal 
courts. For Isaacs, the inclusion of mandamus, prohibition and injunction in the 
clause defining the scope of judicial power would not, itself, serve to make that 
jurisdiction exclusive. The mechanism for making the jurisdiction exclusive was 
specifically set out. Consequently, as Isaacs said, if state judicial power existed 
over federal officers, the inclusion of a clause defining the judicial power of the 
Commonwealth to extend to mandamus, prohibition and injunction against 
officers of the Commonwealth would not displace that jurisdiction. 
In summary, apart from Inglis Clark’s jurisdiction allocating purpose for 
section 75(v), we see two distinct visions of section 75(v): Barton’s 
accountability vision of protecting the individual against the Commonwealth; 
and Symon’s federalist vision of protecting Commonwealth officers from state 
jurisdiction. Because the contributions from other delegates were limited, it is 
difficult to assess how the Convention as a whole was affected by the 
discussions, and on which basis the Convention agreed to reinsert the clauses. 
Furthermore, some of that discussion – including as to Inglis Clark’s design – 
was overtaken by the streamlining of the provisions by the Drafting Committee 
after the debates on the clauses had concluded. What implications then might we 
draw from the debates for our current understanding of section 75(v)? 
 
                                                 
58  Ibid 1882. 
59  Ibid 1877, 1881–2. 
60  Ibid 1878. 
61  Ibid 1879. 
62  Ibid 1881. 
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III IMPLICATIONS 
The last part of this article will consider four implications of this drafting 
history. 
 
A Relationship Between Sections 75(iii) and 75(v) 
The drafting history tells us quite a bit about the relationship between 
sections 75(iii) and 75(v). Observations in High Court cases indicate that section 
75(v) was included in the Constitution out of a concern that claims for 
mandamus, prohibition and injunction against an officer of the Commonwealth 
would not otherwise fall within section 75(iii) of the Constitution. As Gaudron 
and Gummow JJ said in Re Refugee Tribunal; Ex parte Aala: 
It appears that s 75(v) was included as a safeguard against the possibility that the 
provision in s 75(iii) respecting matters in which a person being sued on behalf of 
the Commonwealth is a party would be read down by reference to decisions 
construing Art III of the United States Constitution.63 
Of the four main contributors to the debates on the section 75(v) forerunners, 
only Barton expressed that concern. This concern led him to include a reference 
to the remedies in both the clause defining the extent of Commonwealth judicial 
power and the subsequent clause allocating jurisdiction as original or appellate. 
As explained, however, Inglis Clark’s draft was put forward on the 
assumption that claims for such remedies would fall within a case or controversy 
otherwise set out, and one of the main candidates was the section 75(iii) 
equivalent. Isaacs clearly was of the view that such claims would fall within the 
equivalent of section 75(iii) and, thus, there was no need for its reinsertion. 
Symon seemed to agree with Isaacs’ assessment,64 but supported its reinsertion 
on the basis that it was needed to displace state jurisdiction. However, in this 
respect, if the view were taken that such remedies would otherwise have fallen 
within section 75(iii), then an express reference to the remedies was hardly 
needed. 
Consequently, the reinsertion of the clause can probably only be explained 
either (as the High Court has surmised) by reference to Barton’s concerns that the 
section 75(iii) was inadequate, or according to Symon’s (perhaps misguided) 
concern for abundant caution to protect against state jurisdiction over federal 
officers. The more significant point, however, is that, on all accounts, the 
purposes of sections 75(iii) and 75(v) are symbiotically linked. 
 
B The Meaning of ‘Officer of the Commonwealth’ 
A key manifestation of that symbiotic relationship should be seen in the 
meaning of the words ‘officer of the Commonwealth’ in section 75(v). Very little 
                                                 
63  (2000) 204 CLR 82, 92 (‘Aala’); citing Ah Yick v Lehmert (1905) 2 CLR 593, 608–9; Bank 
Nationalisation case (1948) 76 CLR 1, 363–8; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Richard Walter Pty 
Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 168, 178–9, 204, 221, 231–2. See also Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82, 138–9 (Hayne J). 
64  See above n 41. 
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has been said by the High Court about what that expression means.65 In the recent 
case of Plaintiff M61,66 one of the questions that arose for the Court was whether 
a private contractor could be considered to be an officer of the Commonwealth 
when undertaking an inquiry and making recommendations for the purposes of 
informing a decision by the Minister for Immigration to allow an application for 
a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Because the 
Commonwealth and Minister were also named as parties, the Court otherwise 
had jurisdiction under both sections 75(iii) and 75(v). Consequently, it was not 
required to explore the reach of the expression ‘officer of the Commonwealth’. 
By contrast, the meanings of ‘the Commonwealth’ and ‘a person suing or 
being sued on behalf of the Commonwealth’ have been given closer 
consideration by some High Court judges, as has the purpose of section 75(iii). 
The High Court has generally taken a broad view of those expressions, and has 
done so with certain objectives in mind. In the Bank Nationalisation Case,67 
when explaining why the expression ‘the Commonwealth’ in section 75(iii) 
should be given a broad interpretation to cover the Commonwealth Bank in the 
form it then took, Dixon J said: 
The purpose of s. 75(iii.) obviously was to ensure that the political organization 
called into existence under the name of the Commonwealth and armed with 
enumerated powers and authorities, limited by definition, fell in every way within 
a jurisdiction in which it could be impleaded and which it could invoke.68 
If we focus on the final italicised words in this quotation, there is some 
correspondence with the language used in the drafting history of section 75(v). 
The first part of the section matches Barton’s accountability justification for 
section 75(v) and the second is suggestive of Symon’s justification of protecting 
the Commonwealth from state jurisdiction. 
His Honour then proceeded to link section 75(iii) to section 75(v): 
Section 75(iii.) cannot be read without s. 75(v.) which, it is apparent, was written 
into the instrument to make it constitutionally certain that there would be a 
jurisdiction capable of restraining officers of the Commonwealth from exceeding 
Federal power.69 
This second statement by Dixon J only picks up the accountability purpose 
identified by Barton, and fails to translate Symon’s protective federalist purpose 
into section 75(v). 
                                                 
65  It has been recognised as having a broad meaning: see Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82, 140 (Hayne J). Although 
it covers both judicial and non-judicial officers (see R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and 
Arbitration; Ex parte Whybrow (1910) 11 CLR 1; R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and 
Arbitration; Ex parte Brisbane Tramways Company Ltd (1914) 18 CLR 54), it was held not to cover state 
judges exercising federal jurisdiction in R v Murray; Ex parte Commonwealth (1916) 22 CLR 437 
(‘Murray’). In the course of reaching that conclusion in Murray, Isaacs J said at 452 that ‘[a]n “officer” 
connotes an “office” of some conceivable tenure, and connotes an appointment, and usually a salary.’ His 
Honour’s decision, however, need not be seen as turning on those propositions. 
66  (2010) 272 ALR 14. 
67  (1948) 76 CLR 1. 
68  Bank Nationalisation Case (1948) 76 CLR 1, 363 (emphasis added). 
69  Ibid 363. 
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The two sides of section 75(iii) were again emphasised by Barwick CJ in 
Inglis v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia.70 In supporting his view that 
the expression ‘the Commonwealth’ should be read broadly, his Honour said: 
The fundamental purpose, as it seems to me, of including par. (iii.) in this section 
of the Constitution thus giving original jurisdiction to this Court in all matters in 
which the Commonwealth, or a person suing or being sued on behalf of the 
Commonwealth, is a party was to ensure that the Commonwealth either in its form 
as established under the Constitution, or in any form with which it may lawfully 
clothe itself should not be compelled to pursue its rights in the courts of the States. 
… Consequently, in the construction and application of s. 75(iii.) largeness rather 
than narrowness of approach is appropriate. If in reality the Commonwealth is 
before the Court in the litigation, no matter of form or of nomenclature can be 
allowed to deny the Court jurisdiction to hear and determine the rights asserted by 
or against it.71 
Thus, in relation to the provision that Isaacs (and perhaps Inglis Clark) 
thought would create federal jurisdiction in relation to claims for mandamus and 
prohibition against Commonwealth officers – that is, section 75(iii) – the High 
Court has recognised the purpose of accountability and the federalist purpose to 
protect the Commonwealth from state jurisdiction. However, that understanding 
has not been carried through to section 75(v). 
If both understandings of the purpose of section 75(v) are carried through 
into that provision, then the expression ‘officers of the Commonwealth’ may 
similarly be given a broad meaning when applying that expression to grey areas 
like corporate entities or private actors exercising government functions. 
Commentators have suggested that a broad view of ‘officer of the 
Commonwealth’ might be required to give effect to the purpose of 
accountability.72 Symon’s protective purpose adds strength to that argument. 
Additionally, it might be the case that the protective federalist purpose may 
even allow the expression ‘officer of the Commonwealth’ to be applied in 
circumstances not warranted by an accountability explanation. Plaintiff M61 
might provide a useful example of this point. As a reminder, in that case a private 
contractor undertook an inquiry and made recommendations that informed the 
Minister’s exercise of power under the Migration Act to allow an application for 
a protection visa. On one view, an accountability understanding of section 75(v) 
might result in the private contractor being considered to be a Commonwealth 
officer. On that view, the Commonwealth should not be permitted to contract out 
highly sensitive decision-making to avoid the supervisory jurisdiction of the 
courts. However, on another view, because the ultimate decision rests with the 
Minister, the line of accountability remains intact. Thus, on that view, the 
accountability purpose of section 75(v) may not compellingly lead to an 
application of section 75(v). 
                                                 
70  (1960) 119 CLR 334. 
71  Ibid 335–6 (emphasis added). 
72  See, eg, Peter Cane and Leighton McDonald, Principles of Administrative Law: Legal Regulation of 
Governance (Oxford University Press, 2008) 71–2; Mark Aronson, Bruce Dyer and Matthew Groves, 
Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Lawbook, 4th ed, 2009) 40. 
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The protective federalist view of section 75(v) might, however, call for the 
application of section 75(v) in those circumstances. On this view, the 
Commonwealth should be able to design its legislative decision-making schemes 
– to ‘clothe’ its decision-makers in whichever way it lawfully can – without the 
Commonwealth losing its protection from state jurisdiction.73 This also raises 
broader questions about whether private actors exercising public functions can be 
subjected to prerogative relief.74 The protective federalist understanding of 
section 75(v) might suggest that the private actors may be subject to those writs 
as ‘officers of the Commonwealth’. 
 
C The Existence of State Jurisdiction to Order Writs  
Against Federal Officers 
The question of whether state courts have jurisdiction over federal officers 
has rarely arisen as the Commonwealth very early exercised its power in section 
77(ii) (along with section 77(iii)) to strip states of any jurisdiction that may have 
belonged to them in relation to matters within the jurisdiction of the High Court, 
including section 75(v).75 However, before the High Court was established in 
1903, proceedings were instituted in the NSW Supreme Court for mandamus to 
compel the Commonwealth Collector of Customs to deliver up certain books and 
documents.76 The Commonwealth Parliament had not given state courts federal 
jurisdiction under section 75(v), so if they were to have jurisdiction in this case it 
was to be state jurisdiction. 
In Ex parte Goldring, the Supreme Court held that it had no jurisdiction. In 
rejecting the application, Stephen ACJ considered that neither the state 
legislature nor the state government had ‘anything to do with the matter’: it was 
‘entirely a matter for the Federal Government’.77 The duty owed by the federal 
officer was seen by Stephen ACJ as a duty owed to the federal government not 
the state government, and the failure to perform it was ‘a matter entirely between 
him and the Government that appointed him’.78 It was for the Commonwealth 
Parliament to confer such jurisdiction, but it had not done so. The conceptual 
basis for this position appears more clearly in the decision of Owen J. Finding no 
                                                 
73  As one of the referees has suggested, it is possible that Symon’s view would not necessarily have led to 
this conclusion. It is possible that Symon was simply concerned about protecting federal officers from 
state jurisdiction without having any particular view about how wide that jurisdiction should be. 
However, I think the better view is that the force with which Symon sought to protect federal officers 
from state jurisdiction would translate into a generous view being taken of Parliament’s power to design 
decision-making schemes without losing the benefit of that protection. That appears to have been Chief 
Justice Barwick’s view in relation to s 75(iii) in Inglis: see above n 71. 
74  This was a question left open by the Court in Plaintiff M61 (2010) 272 ALR 14. 
75  See Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 38, 39(1) (‘Judiciary Act’). This was done to exclude appeals as of right 
to the Privy Council from state courts: see James Stellios, The Federal Judicature: Chapter III of the 
Constitution (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2010) [2.80]–[2.81]. See also Administrative Decisions (Judicial 
Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 9, which expressly prevents a state court from exercising review jurisdiction 
under that Act. 
76  Ex parte Goldring (1903) 3 SR (NSW) 260, 262. 
77  Ibid. 
78  Ibid. 
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analogy in any of the English cases, his Honour looked to American authorities 
for assistance and said: 
In America it had been decided over and over again that a mandamus will not lie 
in a State to compel the performance of a duty by a Federal officer. … The 
American decisions appeared to be based upon the principle of separate 
sovereignties, the Federal and the State Government are two distinct entities, as 
distinct to my mind as if they were separated by territorial boundaries.79 
For that reason, Owen J held that the Court had no power to compel the 
performance of duty. His Honour did not cite any American cases, however, he 
was presumably referring at least to the decision of the United States Supreme 
Court in McClung v Silliman,80 relied upon by counsel for the Commonwealth 
Collector of Customs. In that case, the Court considered that a state court had no 
jurisdiction to order mandamus against an officer of the United States 
government. Delivering the Opinion of the Court, Johnson J said that ‘his 
conduct can only be controlled by the power that created him’.81 
It was not until 2008 that three members of the High Court addressed this 
question. In MZXOT,82 the plaintiff instituted proceedings in the High Court 
seeking relief against an officer of the Commonwealth, thereby triggering the 
jurisdiction under section 75(v). The plaintiff then sought an order for the Court 
to remit his application to the Federal Magistrates Court. There was no statutory 
authority for the Court to remit the matter, nor jurisdiction vested in the Federal 
Magistrates Court to hear it. The plaintiff instead argued that the Court had an 
‘implied power’ to do so. In the course of determining this question, Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ considered whether, in the absence of sections 38 and 
39(1) of the Judiciary Act, a state court would have jurisdiction to hear a claim 
that otherwise triggered federal jurisdiction under section 75(v). 
In responding to this issue, their Honours observed that some heads of federal 
jurisdiction in sections 75 and 76 ‘identify controversies well known in the 
anterior body of general jurisprudence in the colonies (for example, actions in 
tort or contract between residents of the former colonies)’.83 However, other 
heads, including section 75(v), identify controversies which were not.84 This 
distinction, their Honours said, ‘was apparent to Inglis Clark’ in 1901, when he 
wrote that there are certain matters in which the judicial power of the 
Commonwealth is ‘necessarily exclusive of the judicial power of the States’,85 
and in relation to which state courts would need federal jurisdiction. One of those 
matters was where a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought 
against an officer of the Commonwealth.86 In support of that proposition, Inglis 
                                                 
79  Ibid 264. 
80  19 US 598 (1821). 
81  Ibid 605. 
82  (2008) 233 CLR 601. 
83  Ibid, 619; citing Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Victoria (2002) 211 CLR 1, 33–4, 36–7. 
84  Ibid; citing Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 171. 
85  A Inglis Clark, Studies in Australian Constitutional Law (G Partridge & Co, 1901) 177–8; quoted in 
MZXOT (2008) 233 CLR 601, 620 (emphasis added). 
86  Ibid. 
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Clark referred to the United States case of McClung v Silliman, the same decision 
later relied upon by counsel for the Collector in Goldring. In accepting the 
position of Inglis Clark, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ also relied upon the 
authority of Goldring and the subsequent supporting observations of Harrison 
Moore.87 
The difficulty with this explanation, as Professor Leslie Zines has pointed 
out, is that covering clause 5 of the Constitution makes the Constitution and 
Commonwealth legislation binding on state courts.88 Thus, irrespective of 
whether the controversies were familiar to state courts prior to federation, the 
Constitution appears to mandate the application (and presumably the 
enforcement) of constitutional and federal statutory provisions authorising 
federal officers to act. In MZXOT, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ appeared 
to be alert to this issue, but discounted it as a problem: 
In the United States, the circumstance that a State court had inherited the 
jurisdiction of the Court of King’s Bench with respect to mandamus, and the 
operation of the Supremacy Clause in Art VI and the reservation of powers to the 
States by the 10th Amendment, did not have the consequence that mandamus 
might issue from that State court to a federal officer. In Australia the same may be 
said of covering cl 5 of the Constitution.89 
But, upon what basis can it be said that covering clause 5 can be put to one 
side? Do the contributions of our key delegates during the Convention Debates 
shed any light on this question? 
Despite the NSW Supreme Court’s confident conclusion in Goldring, as 
explained above, there was considerable uncertainty as to whether state courts 
would have state jurisdiction in relation to claims for mandamus and prohibition 
against Commonwealth officers. Without clearly stating that there would be state 
jurisdiction, Symon insisted that section 75(v) had to be inserted into the clause 
defining the extent of Commonwealth judicial power so as to prevent that 
eventuality. For Symon (and at least Braddon), the insertion of section 75(v) 
would make the jurisdiction exclusively federal. In challenging Symon’s 
understanding of section 75(v) in this respect, Isaacs merely hypothesised about 
the existence of such state jurisdiction, without stating a view.  
On one view, by initially urging the striking out of the reference to 
mandamus and prohibition from both the clause defining the extent of judicial 
power and the subsequent clause allocating original and appellate jurisdiction, 
Barton may be taken to have considered it possible for state courts to consider 
such claims and for the High Court to consider the issue on appeal. There is some 
suggestion to this effect in his explanation of the American decisions,90 although 
his position on this issue was far from clear. As for Inglis Clark, his only 
                                                 
87  W Harrison Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia (G Partridge & Co, 2nd ed, 1910,) 
212–13; cited in MZXOT (2008) 233 CLR 601, 621. 
88  Leslie Zines, ‘Federal, Associated and Accrued Jurisdiction’ in Brian Opeskin and Fiona Wheeler (eds), 
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89  MZXOT (2008) 233 CLR 601, 621 (emphasis added). Covering cl 5 largely replicates language in the Art 
VI.2 supremacy clause. 
90  Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 4 March 1898, 1879. 
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indication came after the debates in his 1901 publication, but there is no reason to 
suggest that he did not have the same view when he proposed the draft clauses. 
Therefore, the Convention Debates do not reveal a clear answer to this 
question. They do, however, suggest two possibilities, each with its difficulties. 
The first is that Symon’s views should be seen as an indication by the framers 
that section 75(v) was intended to create exclusive federal jurisdiction. It seems 
to be accepted that ‘[t]he various powers conferred upon Parliament by 
provisions in Chapter III are necessarily exclusive of those of the state 
legislatures’.91 Why not then the jurisdiction created by Chapter III? Of course, 
there are difficulties here as there are many heads of jurisdiction that would have 
otherwise fallen within state jurisdiction, for example, the diversity jurisdiction in 
section 75(iv). It might be argued that the heads of jurisdiction like sections 
75(iii) and 75(v) are necessarily federal because of their express reference to the 
federal body politic and its officers. However, as discussed above, the larger 
obstacle is that Chapter III itself (in sections 77(ii) and 77(iii)) identifies the 
mechanism for making federal jurisdiction exclusive.92 
The second possibility is that the Constitution itself, by implication, denies 
the possibility of State jurisdiction. In MZXOT, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and 
Hayne JJ suggested as much by saying, when referring to the operation of 
covering clause 5, ‘that which is rendered “binding” is the federal scheme 
manifested in the text and structure of the Constitution. This includes Chapter III 
and the various inferences which have been held to follow necessarily from that 
federal scheme.’93 It may be that their Honours are here referring to the theory of 
separate sovereignties referred to by Owen J in Goldring and which appeared to 
form the basis of the United States Supreme Court decision in McClung v 
Silliman. The significant obstacle, however, confronting the Court on this path is 
that the separate sovereignties theory formed the basis of pre-Engineers 
doctrines,94 and both the theory and the doctrines were discredited in that case. 
Of course, federal immunities have re-emerged since the Engineers Case,95 
however, there is no attempt in the joint judgment to explain how the new 
principles would support the Goldring conclusion other than a brief appeal to 
federal implications. 
Thus, there are difficulties in explaining why covering clause 5 should not 
result in state courts considering claims for mandamus and prohibition against 
Commonwealth officers. Although this issue may now be moot in relation to 
section 75(v), the same issue arises in relation to section 75(iii),96 and may 
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resurface in the future as the High Court grapples with the creation of state 
tribunals that exercise judicial power and can potentially consider proceedings 
involving the Commonwealth.97 
 
D Entrenched Minimum Provision of Judicial Review 
As mentioned in the introduction, five judges in Plaintiff S 157 recognised 
that section 75(v) introduced ‘an entrenched minimum provision of judicial 
review’.98 What that exactly means is unclear and has been the subject of 
considerable academic commentary.99 Of particular interest has been the 
possibility that section 75(v) might prevent Parliament from adjusting the scope 
of executive decision-making authority so as to affect the availability of the 
remedies identified in section 75(v). The final observation to be explored further 
in this section is that the Convention Debates do not provide a clear guide for 
fleshing out what the High Court means by this proposition. 
What is clear is that some of the delegates were concerned that the creation of 
jurisdiction for the Court to hear claims for mandamus and prohibition against 
Commonwealth officers would unsettle the established relationship between the 
judiciary and the executive. For example, Patrick Glynn referred to an article in 
the Law Times in which it was claimed that Marbury v Madison was responsible 
for state courts in America asserting the power to control the executive 
departments. Glynn then warned that ‘[w]e are putting it in the power of the 
Federal Judiciary to interfere with the Federal Executive, which, in America, is 
complained of as an unconstitutional interference with the executive departments 
of the state.’100 Kingston shared those concerns.101 
Although the contested clause at the time sought to define the extent of 
judicial power, rather than jurisdiction as was to be the case once the Drafting 
Committee reduced section 75(v) to its final form, Barton and Symon moved 
quickly to dispel any misconceptions. The reinsertion of mandamus and 
prohibition into the clause that defined the extent of Commonwealth judicial 
power would serve only to create jurisdiction. Symon said, ‘[t]he provision does 
not confer, and is not intended to confer … any right whatever to interfere [with 
the political Executive of the Federation]. It merely gives a jurisdiction.’102 The 
colonial courts had jurisdiction to issue mandamus and prohibition against 
executive officers, and all that section 75(v) did was to create federal jurisdiction 
in relation to Commonwealth officers.103 Barton agreed that the proposal did ‘not 
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confer any right’.104 Of course, as discussed above, Barton and Symon had 
different reasons for creating the jurisdiction, but both delegates insisted that the 
creation of jurisdiction was all that was being achieved by its reinsertion.105 
As for Inglis Clark and Isaacs, neither considered that the section 75(v) 
forerunner added any extra jurisdiction to what would otherwise be created. 
Inglis Clark intended it to allocate original jurisdiction to the Court in those 
cases, and Isaacs thought that the changes made since Inglis Clark’s draft that 
gave the High Court the equivalent of section 75(iii) original jurisdiction left no 
room for section 75(v). Thus, for those delegates, section 75(v) did not create 
jurisdiction.106 
What does this tell us about our minimum content of judicial review? The 
views of Inglis Clark and Isaacs take us no further. Neither delegate saw a 
relevantly important role for the section 75(v) forerunner in creating jurisdiction 
and, in any event, their preferred designs were not adopted. As for Symon, there 
is a tension between, on the one hand, his confident assertions that the inclusion 
of the provision would not interfere with the established relationship between the 
judiciary and the executive and, on the other hand, the very idea that section 
75(v) entrenches a limitation on Parliament. On most accounts of the entrenched 
minimum content, the relationship between the judiciary and the executive is 
somehow constitutionally immunised from alteration. However, when one 
remembers Symon’s purpose for the section 75(v) forerunner, the tension 
disappears. For Symon, section 75(v) operated to protect Commonwealth officers 
from state jurisdiction. If Parliament chose to modify the underlying relationship 
between the courts and the executive so as to enhance or diminish that protection, 
then that was a matter for its judgment. 
It is only Barton’s accountability purpose that provides a foundation for 
reading in some limitations on what Parliament can do with the scope of 
executive power. That section 75(v) was needed to hold Commonwealth officers 
to account suggests a good reason for imposing at least some limitations on the 
Commonwealth Parliament avoiding the operation of section 75(v). However, 
there are two final points of caution in this respect. The first is that Barton’s 
contributions (and those of other delegates) provide no further insight as to what 
those limitations might be. Not only was there some imprecision in the way that 
Barton presented the need to reinsert the section 75(v) forerunners, his 
accountability explanation was only put forward at the end of the debates on the 
reinsertion of the provisions without any further contributions from other 
delegates on the purpose of the provision. Secondly, as explained in this article, 
the accountability purpose was not the only one put forward during the debates. 
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Importantly, Symon’s protective federalist explanation seemed to have an equally 
important impact on the delegates’ understanding of the provision. 
 
IV CONCLUSION 
The accountability view of section 75(v) has dominated our understanding of 
why section 75(v) was included in the Constitution and the way in which the 
High Court has seen it operating. There are certainly strong historical and 
normative reasons for accountability ideas to inform the way in which section 
75(v) should operate. However, focusing solely on this accountability 
understanding can obscure some of the important features of section 75(v). 
A closer consideration of the drafting history reveals and explains the 
symbiotic connection between sections 75(v) and 75(iii) – a connection that the 
High Court has assumed but not explored. Furthermore, a closer look at the 
drafting history reveals an equally significant federalist explanation for section 
75(v) – an explanation that is yet to be properly accommodated within section 
75(v). Section 75(v) has always been viewed as an important mechanism of 
federal constitutional government. What this article has shown is that the picture 
is more complex: section 75(v) has multiple layers, with each explaining the 
place of section 75(v) in Chapter III of the Constitution. 
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